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Abstract. Mechanistic explanations satisfy widely held norms of explanation: the ability to 
control and answer counterfactual questions about the explanandum. A currently debated 
issue is whether any non-mechanistic explanations can satisfy these explanatory norms. 
Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of explanation. In this 
paper I will argue that these models are sketches of mechanisms. My argument will make use 
of model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging approach whose significance for current debates 
on psychological models and mechanistic explanation has yet to be explored. 
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1. Introduction  
 According to the mechanistic account of explanation, a phenomenon is explained by 
describing the entities, activities, and organization of the mechanism that produces, underlies, 
or maintains the phenomenon (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). Mechanistic 
explanations satisfy what are widely considered normative constraints of explanation: the 
ability to answer a range of counterfactual questions regarding the explanandum 
phenomenon and the ability to manipulate and control the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 
2007). These norms capture what is distinctive about the scientific achievement of 
explanation rather than prediction, description, or categorization. A currently debated issue is 
whether any non-mechanistic forms of explanation can satisfy these explanatory norms.1 
Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of explanation.  
In this paper, in part using recent model-based fMRI research, I will argue that JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE are in fact mechanism-sketches, i.e. incomplete mechanistic 
explanations. Model-based approaches to neuroimaging allow cognitive neuroscientists to 
locate the distributed neural components of psychological models. These novel neuroimaging 
approaches have developed only recently and philosophers have yet to discuss their 
significance for current debates on psychological models and mechanistic explanation. The 
                                                 
1 A recent paper arguing affirmatively is Batterman and Rice (2014). 
  
opportunity to demonstrate this significance is one advantage of responding to Weiskopf 
(2011) in particular.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will motivate the mechanistic 
account of explanation and introduce two crucial concepts in the mechanistic account: the 
mechanism-sketch and the how-possibly model. In Section 3, I will introduce the models of 
object recognition and categorization (JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE) that Weiskopf 
presents as non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. In Section 4, I will present Weiskopf’s 
arguments for thinking these models are non-mechanistic, yet explanatory, and I will begin 
responding to these arguments. This section demonstrates that JIM is a mechanism-sketch. 
Demonstrating that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches requires covering 
recent studies employing model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging method that will be 
explained in section 5.   
2. Mechanistic Explanation 
 Salmon (1984) developed the causal-mechanical account of explanation primarily in 
response to the covering-law or deductive-nomological model of explanation (Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948). According to the deductive-nomological model, an explanation is an 
argument with descriptions of at least one law of nature and antecedent conditions as 
premises and a description of the explanandum phenomenon as the conclusion. On this view, 
explanation is showing that the explanandum phenomenon is predictable given at least one 
law of nature and certain specific antecedent and boundary conditions. However, tying 
explanation this closely to prediction generates some famous problems for the covering-law 
  
model (see section 2.3 of Salmon [1989] for a review of these problems). On such a view, 
many mere correlations come out as explanatory. For example, a falling barometer reliably 
predicts the weather but the falling barometer does not explain the weather. In contrast, on 
the causal-mechanical view, explanation involves situating the explanandum phenomenon in 
the causal structure of the world. There are many ways of situating a phenomenon in the 
causal structure of the world and in this paper I am solely concerned with explanations that 
identify the mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the explanandum 
phenomenon.2 
 Another problem with tying explanation so closely to prediction is that we miss what 
is distinctive about the scientific achievement of explanation. Weiskopf (2011) and I agree on 
what makes explanation distinctive: explanations provide the ability to answer a range of 
counterfactual questions regarding the explanandum phenomenon and the ability to 
manipulate and control the explanandum phenomenon. These are the norms of explanation. 
Weiskopf and I disagree over what kinds of explanation can satisfy these norms. 
 Within the mechanistic framework there are two important distinctions: between 
complete mechanistic models and mechanism-sketches and between how-possibly and how-
actually models (Craver 2007). Mechanism-sketches are incomplete descriptions of 
                                                 
2 Other ways of causally situating a phenomenon include etiologically and contextually 
situating it. See Bechtel (2009) for a discussion of some of these different forms of causal 
explanation. What Bechtel calls “looking down” I am here calling “mechanistic explanation.” 
  
mechanisms that may contain black boxes and filler terms (Ibid., 113). Mechanistic models 
rest on a continuum of more-or-less complete (114). As more details are incorporated into the 
model, the more complete it becomes – though no model is ever fully complete, just 
complete enough for practical purposes. A more complete model is not necessarily a better or 
more useful model. There can certainly be too many details for the purposes of the modeler 
and the details that are included should be relevant.3 Idealization can be readily 
accommodated within a mechanistic framework.  
 A how-possibly model describes a merely possible mechanism, whereas a how-
actually model describes the mechanism actually producing, maintaining, or underlying the 
explanandum phenomenon. As Weiskopf (315) rightly points out, this distinction is 
epistemic. Turning a how-possibly model into a how-actually model does not require 
modifying the model itself in any way; it requires testing the model. The greater the 
evidential support for the model, the more how-actually it is. In contrast, turning a 
mechanism-sketch into a complete(-enough) model requires modifying the model by filling 
in missing details. 
3. JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE 
 In this section I introduce the models of object recognition and categorization JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE. The next section presents Weiskopf’s arguments for thinking these 
models are non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. 
                                                 
3 See Craver (2007, section 4.8) for an account of constitutive (i.e. mechanistic) relevance. 
  
 According to JIM (John and Irv’s Model), in perception objects are broken down into 
viewpoint-invariant primitives called “geons”. These geons are simple three-dimensional 
shapes such as cones, bricks, and cylinders. The properties of geons are intended to be non-
accidental properties (NAPs), largely unaffected by rotation in depth (Biederman 2000). The 
geon structure of perceived objects is extracted and stored in memory for later use in 
comparison and classification. 
 The importance of NAPs is shown by the fact that sequential matching tasks are 
extremely easy when stimuli only differ in NAPs. If you are shown a stimulus, then a series 
of other, rotated stimuli, each of which differs from the first only in NAPs, it is a simple 
matter to judge which stimuli are the same as or different than the first. Sequential matching 
tasks with objects that differ in properties that are affected by rotation are much harder. 
 In JIM, this object recognition process is modeled by a seven layer neural network 
(Biederman, Cooper, and Fiser 1993). Layer 1 extracts image edges from an input of a line 
drawing that represents the orientation and depth of an object (182). Layer 2 has three 
components which represent vertices, axes, and blobs. Layer 3 represents geon attributes 
such as size, orientation, and aspect ratio. Layers 4 and 5 both derive invariant relations from 
the extracted geon attributes. Layer 6 receives inputs from layers 3 and 5 and assembles geon 
features, e.g., “slightly elongated, vertical cone above, perpendicular to and smaller than 
something” (184). Layer 7 integrates successive outputs from layer 6 and produces an object 
judgment. 
  
The Attention Learning Covering map (ALCOVE) is a 3-layer, feed-forward, neural 
network model of object categorization (Kruschke 1992). A perceived stimulus is represented 
as a point in a multi-dimensional psychological space with each input node representing a 
single, continuous psychological dimension. For example, a node may represent perceived 
size, in which case the greater the perceived size of a stimulus, the greater the activation of 
that node. Each node is modulated by an attentional gate whose strength reflects the 
relevance of that dimension for the categorization task. Each hidden node represents an 
exemplar and is activated in proportion to the psychological similarity of the input stimulus 
to the exemplar. Output nodes represent category responses and are activated by summing 
hidden nodes and multiplying by the corresponding weights. 
 The Supervised and Unsupervised Stratified Adaptive Incremental Network 
(SUSTAIN) is a network model of object categorization similar to ALCOVE (Love, Medin, 
and Gureckis 2004). Its input nodes also represent a multidimensional psychological space, 
but they can take continuous and discrete values, including category labels. Like ALCOVE, 
inputs are modulated by an attentional gate. Unlike ALCOVE, which stores all items 
individually in memory in exemplar nodes, the next layer of SUSTAIN consists of a set of 
clusters associated with a category. All of SUSTAIN’s clusters compete to respond, with 
inhibitory connections between each cluster, and the cluster closest to the stimulus in the 
multidimensional space is the winner. The cluster that wins activates the output unit 
predicting the category label. The output leads to a decision procedure that generates a 
category response.  
  
4. Weiskopf’s Objections 
 Weiskopf argues that the previous models are able to satisfy the norms of explanation 
but are not mechanistic models. How do these models provide the ability to answer 
counterfactual questions about, and the ability to manipulate and control, the explanandum 
phenomenon? According to Weiskopf, they satisfy explanatory norms “because these models 
depict one aspect of the causal structure of the system” (334). This claim is in tension with 
one reason Weiskopf gives for thinking these models are not mechanistic. He argues, “there 
may be an underlying mechanistic neural system, but this mechanistic structure is not what 
cognitive models capture. They capture a level of functional abstraction that this mechanistic 
structure realizes” (333). But the claim that these models are not mechanistic because they 
depict a level of functional abstraction, not causal structure, conflicts with the claim that 
these models are explanatory because they depict causal structure. This conflict results from 
the general difficulty of specifying how a model can satisfy the norms of explanation without 
being mechanistic. 
One way of trying to reconcile the above claims is to argue that these models are 
explanatory because they depict causal structure, but they are not mechanistic, because the 
causal structure that is depicted is not a mechanism. This is the line Weiskopf takes. Why, 
according to Weiskopf, are these causal structures not mechanisms? He argues that 
If parts [of mechanisms] are allowed to be smeared-out processes or distributed 
system-level properties, the spatial organization of mechanisms becomes much more 
difficult to discern. … Weakening the spatial organization constraint by allowing 
  
distributed, nonlocalized parts incurs costs, in the form of greater difficulty in 
locating the boundaries of mechanisms and stating their individuation conditions. 
(334) 
The causal structures depicted by JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE should not be thought of as 
mechanisms, according to Weiskopf, because these structures are highly distributed. If 
mechanisms are allowed to contain distributed parts, this will make locating them difficult. 
The problem, then, is practical. Weiskopf does not give any reason to think the philosophical 
(rather than practical) problem of mechanism individuation is made more difficult by 
allowing distributed parts. 4 Yet numerous neuroimaging methods, especially model-based 
fMRI, allow cognitive neuroscientists to locate highly distributed neural mechanisms 
corresponding to the internal variables of computational models. Cognitive neuroscientists 
are interested in more than the behavioral accuracy of these models; they are also interested 
in their mechanistic accuracy. That cognitive neuroscientists conduct neuroimaging studies 
using these models shows that they are treated as mechanistic. Next I will present some of 
the neuroimaging studies conducted with JIM and argue that JIM is a mechanism-sketch. 
                                                 
4 Weiskopf (331) also cites the phenomenon of neural reuse as inconsistent with mechanism. 
This assumes that a part of one mechanism cannot be a part of another mechanism but 
Weiskopf has not provided any reason to think this nor to think that the possibility of reuse 
should give rise to any special philosophical (rather than practical) problems of mechanism 
individuation. 
  
 JIM was built, not merely to produce the same behavior as human beings in object 
recognition tasks, but to model something that might really be happening in human brains. 
Biederman et al. write, “We have concentrated on modeling primal access: The initial 
activation in a human brain of a basic-level representation of an image from an object 
exemplar, even a novel one, in the absence of any context that might reduce the set of 
possible objects” (Biederman, Cooper, Hummel and Fiser 1993, 176). Accordingly, Irving 
Biederman, one of the co-creators of JIM, and others have conducted various neuroimaging 
studies to investigate the neural underpinnings of the model.  
If JIM is a mechanism-sketch, the systems and processes in the model required for the 
extraction, storage, and comparison of geon structures must to some extent correspond to 
(perhaps distributed) components in the actual object recognition mechanisms in the brain. 
For example, if JIM is a mechanism-sketch, there is an area or a configuration of areas in the 
brain where simple parts and non-accidental properties are represented. In one study 
(Hayworth and Biederman 2006), subjects were shown line drawings that were either local 
feature deleted (LFD), in which every other vertex and line was deleted from each part, 
removing half the contour, or part deleted (PD) in which half of the parts were removed. On 
each experimental run, subjects saw either LFD or PD stimuli presented as a sequential pair 
and had to respond whether or not the exemplars were the same or different. The second 
stimulus was always mirror-reversed with respect to the first. Each run was comprised of an 
equal number of three conditions: Identical, Complementary, and Different Exemplar. In the 
Identical condition, the second stimulus was the same as the first stimulus (mirror-reversed, 
  
as all of the second stimuli were). In the Complementary condition, the second stimulus was 
the complement of the first, where an LFD-complement is composed of the deleted contour 
of the first and a PD-complement is composed of the deleted parts of the first. In the 
Different Exemplar condition, the second stimulus is a line-drawing of a different exemplar 
than the first. 
 An fMRI-adaptation design was used, which “relies on the assumption that neural 
adaptation reduces activity when two successive stimuli activate the same subpopulation but 
not when they stimulate different subpopulations” (Krekelberg, Boynton, van Wezel 2006, 
250; see also Kourtzi and Grill-Spector 2005). The results of the study showed adaptation 
between LFD complements and lack of adaptation between PD complements in lateral 
occipital complex, especially the posterior fusiform area, an area known to be involved in 
object recognition. These results imply that this area is “representing the parts of an object, 
rather than local features, templates, or object concepts” (Hayworth and Biederman 2006, 
4029). Biederman has conducted many other fMRI experiments, including some that 
“suggest that LO [lateral occipital cortex] is the locus of the neural correlate for the greater 
detectability for nonaccidental relations” (Kim and Biederman 1824). 
 While these results resolve Weiskopf’s worry about the difficulty of locating 
distributed parts, he has another argument for why JIM is not mechanistic. JIM has properties 
that do not and could not correspond to anything in the brain. Weiskopf (2011, 331) mentions 
JIM’s “Fast Enabling Links” (FELs), which allow the model to bind representations and 
which have infinite propagation speed. According to Weiskopf, FELs are an example of 
  
fictionalization, “putting components into a model that are known not to correspond to any 
element of the modeled system, but which serve an essential role in getting the model to 
operate correctly” (Ibid.), and he argues that this undermines the claim that JIM is a 
mechanism-sketch. Weiskopf is right that FELs are an essential fictionalization, but playing 
an essential role in getting a model to operate is not the same as explaining; these parts of the 
model carry no explanatory information and render the model, or at least part of it, how-
possibly (where the possibility involved is not physical possibility, since FELs are physically 
impossible). Right now FELs play the black box role of whatever-it-is-that-accounts-for-
binding. In addition to playing a black box role, they serve practical and epistemic purposes 
like the ones discussed by Bogen (2005), such as suggesting, constraining, and sharpening 
questions about mechanisms. Let me explain how by comparing FELs to Bogen’s example of 
the GHK equations.  
The Goldman, Hodgkin, and Katz (GHK) voltage and current equations are used to 
determine the reversal potential across a cell’s membrane and the current across the 
membrane carried by an ion. These equations rely on the incorrect assumptions that each ion 
channel is homogeneous and that interactions among ions do not influence their rate (Bogen 
409). About the inadequacy of these equations Bogen writes, 
While some generalizations are useful because they deliver empirically acceptable 
quantitative approximations, others are useful because they do not… Investigators 
used these and other GHK equation failures as problems to be solved by finding out 
more about how ion channels work. Fine-grained descriptions of exceptions to the 
  
GHK equations and the conditions under which they occur sharpened the problems 
and provided hints about how to approach them. (Bogen 410) 
The GHK equations provide a case of “using incorrect generalizations to articulate and 
develop mechanistic explanations” (Bogen 409). I argue that something similar can be said 
about FELs. Not only do FELs play an essential black box role, FELs suggest new questions 
about mechanisms, new problems to be solved. For example, Hummel and Biederman (1992) 
write, 
[T]he independence of FELs and standard excitatory-inhibitory connections in JIM 
has important computational consequences. Specifically, this independence allows 
JIM to treat the constraints on feature linking (by synchrony) separately from the 
constraints on property inference (by excitation and inhibition). That is, cells can 
phase lock without influencing one another’s level of activity and vice versa. 
Although it remains an open question whether a neuroanatomical analog of FELs will 
be found to exist, we suggest that the distinction between feature linking and property 
inference is likely to remain an important one. (510) 
Like the GHK equations, FELs suggest new lines of investigation, in this case regarding the 
relation between feature linking, property inference, and their neural mechanisms. 
Specifically, FELs suggest questions such as, “Can biological neurons phase lock without 
influencing one another’s activity?” and “Are there other ways biological neurons could 
implement feature linking and property inference independently?”. 
  
 In the next section, I will explain model-based fMRI and demonstrate how recent 
model-based fMRI studies show that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches. 
5. Model-Based fMRI 
 Model-based fMRI is a neuroimaging method that aims to discover the neural 
mechanisms that correspond to model variables. Model-based fMRI “can be used as a means 
of discriminating between competing computational models of cognitive and neural function. 
Thus, model-based fMRI provides insight into 'how' a particular cognitive function might be 
implemented in the brain, not only 'where' it is implemented” (O' Doherty, Hampton, and 
Kim 39). In this way, model-based fMRI provides a way of discriminating between 
competing, equally behaviorally confirmed cognitive models (Glascher and O’Doherty 502). 
 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a neuroimaging method that 
provides an indirect measure of neuronal activity. Neuronal activity requires glucose and 
oxygen for fuel, which the vascular system provides. The oxygen is bound to hemoglobin 
molecules and the magnetic properties of deoxygenated hemoglobin are detectable by fMRI. 
In this way, fMRI measures a physiological indicator of oxygen consumption – 
deoxyhemoglobin concentration – that correlates with changes in neuronal activity (Huettel, 
Song, and McCarthy 159-160). 
 To conduct a model-based fMRI analysis, one starts with a computational model that 
describes the function(s) by which stimuli are transformed to result in behavioral output. 
Stimulus input and behavioral output are observable, but the computational model postulates 
internal variables linking input and output. The neural correlates of these internal variables, at 
  
each time point in the experiment, can then be located using regression analyses (O' Doherty, 
Hampton, and Kim 36).  
The variables that change from trial to trial are converted into a time series of the 
model-predicted BOLD (blood-oxygen-level dependent) response and then convolved with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (Glascher and O’Doherty 505). This just means 
that the predicted variable values, taken over time, are mathematically combined with a 
stereotypical BOLD signal function. This is done to account for the usual lag in the 
hemodynamic response (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 37). This yields a new function that, 
when put into a general linear model, can be regressed against fMRI data. General linear 
models have the following form:  
y = B0 + B1 x1 + B2 x2 + … + Bn xn + e 
where y is the observed data, the xi are regressors (the model-predicted time series), the Bi are 
variable weights (B0 represents the contribution of factors held constant throughout the 
experiment), and e is residual noise in the data (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 343). This 
allows researchers to identify brain areas where the model-predicted time series significantly 
correlates with the observed BOLD signal changes over time. 
 I should make clear that model-based fMRI has limitations and does not obviate the 
need for other neuroimaging methods (e.g., PET, EEG, or MEG). Like fMRI in general, 
model-based fMRI can only establish correlations between neural activity and behavior. In 
order to establish causal claims about neural activity and behavior, the same methods need to 
be used that were used before the introduction of model-based fMRI, such as lesioning and 
  
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 50). Like fMRI in 
general, model-based fMRI also has poor spatiotemporal resolution. This means that small 
computational signals such as those at the level of the single neuron will go undetected by 
model-based fMRI. For these reasons, a model-based approach to other neuroimaging 
methods is needed (Ibid.) 
Now that we have a basic understanding of how model-based fMRI works and what it 
can accomplish, let me return to SUSTAIN and ALCOVE and show how they are 
mechanism-sketches by drawing on recent model-based fMRI research.  
Both models were investigated in a model-based fMRI study in which participants 
completed a rule-plus-exception category learning task (Davis, Love, and Preston 2012). 
During the task, a schematic beetle was presented and subjects were asked to classify it as 
“Hole A” or “Hole B,” after which they received feedback. The beetles varied on four of the 
following five attributes, with the fifth held constant: eyes (green or red), tail (oval or 
triangular), legs (thin or thick), antennae (spindly or fuzzy), and fangs (pointy or round). Six 
of the eight beetles presented could be correctly categorized on the basis of a single attribute. 
For example, three out of four Hole A beetles might have thick legs and three out of four 
Hole B beetles could have thin legs. The other beetles were exceptions to the rule, having 
legs that appeared to match the other category.  
 Two predictions from SUSTAIN and ALCOVE were tested. First, during stimulus 
presentation SUSTAIN predicts a recognition advantage for exceptions but ALCOVE 
predicts no recognition advantage. This is called the recognition strength measure. This 
  
difference in recognition strength measure predictions arises because in ALCOVE, but not in 
SUSTAIN, all items are stored individually in memory regardless of whether they are 
exceptions or rule-following items. Second, when subjects are given feedback, both 
SUSTAIN and ALCOVE predict that exceptions should lead to greater prediction error. This 
is called the error correction measure (Ibid., 263-4).  
 The results showed that the recognition strength measures and error correction 
measures predicted by SUSTAIN found correlations in MTL regions including bilateral 
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex, and regions in bilateral 
hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, respectively. ALCOVE's predicted recognition strength 
measures did not find correlations in MTL, although its error correction predictions found 
correlations in MTL similar to SUSTAIN's (Ibid., 266-7). These results “suggest that, like 
SUSTAIN, the MTL contributes to category learning by forming specialized category 
representations appropriate for the learning context” (Davis, Love, and Preston 269). 
Furthermore, these correspondences to brain areas open a whole new range of opportunities 
for manipulation and provide answers to counterfactual questions that were not available 
before, thereby increasing the explanatory power of these models. 
  SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches. SUSTAIN is more how-actually 
than ALCOVE because both of SUSTAIN’s prediction measures (recognition strength and 
error correction) were significantly correlated to areas of brain activation, whereas only one 
of ALCOVE’s (error correction) was correlated. SUSTAIN, therefore, has more evidential 
support than ALCOVE. These results also show that cognitive neuroscientists are currently 
  
advancing the ability to map the entities and activities in psychological models to distributed 
neural systems, such as MTL regions spanning bilateral hippocampus, parahippocampal 
cortex, and perirhinal cortex.  
Davis, Love, and Preston (2012) are at times quite explicit about the mechanistic 
nature of the models they are investigating, although they do not use the term “mechanistic.” 
For instance, they write, “We use a model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) approach to test the proposed mapping between MTL function and SUSTAIN’s 
representational properties” (261) and “The theory we forward relating SUSTAIN to the 
MTL…goes beyond the model’s equations by tying model operations to brain regions” (270). 
Given their emphasis on mapping models to the brain, it is clear that they intend the models 
to be mechanistic. They are interested in more than the behavioral accuracy of these models. 
SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are already behaviorally well-confirmed, but model-based fMRI 
allowed Davis et al. to test their mechanistic accuracy. 
6. Conclusion 
 Weiskopf (2011) presented three models of object recognition and categorization, 
JIM, ALCOVE, and SUSTAIN, that he claimed were non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. He 
argued that they were not mechanistic because their parts could not be neatly localized and 
they contained some components, such as Fast Enabling Links (FELs), which could not 
correspond to anything in the brain but are nevertheless essential for the proper working of 
the model. I argued on the contrary that these models are mechanism-sketches. In addition to 
  
playing a black box role, FELs possess non-explanatory virtues such as suggesting new lines 
of investigation about feature linking and property inference.  
My argument for the claim that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches 
relied on model-based fMRI research. Model-based fMRI and other model-based 
neuroimaging approaches are beginning to allow cognitive neuroscientists to map 
psychological models onto the brain. Cognitive neuroscientists can then discriminate 
between equally behaviorally confirmed psychological models. The development of these 
model-based approaches has broader implications, beyond the narrow dispute over JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, for the debate over the explanatory and mechanistic status of 
psychological models. As cognitive neuroscientists continue to test psychological models 
against neuroimaging data using model-based techniques, they will retain those models that 
find correspondences in the brain and reject those that do not, and in so doing reveal that 
explanatory progress in cognitive neuroscience consists in the development of increasingly 
mechanistic models. 
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